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ON LAW REVIEWS 
James Boyle† 
HIS IS A LIGHTHEARTED ATTEMPT to explain why law reviews are 
so bad for both authors and editors, written from the perspective 
of various prominent schools of legal theory. It will have no 
footnotes, but this is where the footnote to Fred Rodell would 
have been.  
Before I go on let me agree with you that this is a mere caricature, that 
your personal experience both as law review editor and as author has been 
nothing like what I describe here, that these problems were always imagi-
nary, and have been fixed recently by a bold series of reforms, that the 
issues I bring up only affect the schools at the top, bottom or middle of the 
perceived hierarchy, that you never publish in law reviews anyway, pre-
ferring peer-reviewed journals, and that there is certainly not a substantial 
literature suggesting that peer-reviewed journals have their own patholo-
gies or, when empirically assessed, might flunk peer review. All of those 
things are either true, false, mythical, historical or motivated by malice – 
just as you would wish.  
The basic puzzle is obvious, if complex. Why does law, alone out of all 
the disciplines, turn over a vital function of the academy – the production, 
curation and distribution of scholarly content – to a group of second and 
third year students? It is not merely the literal Saturnalian inversion of the 
hierarchy, or the fact that careers, tenure decisions and the progress of  
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A typically saturnalian law review office. 
J.R. Weguelin, The Roman saturnalia (Dec. 1884), in The Miriam and Ira  
D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs, N.Y. Public Library. 
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science and the useful arts may depend on the whims of a group of students 
who in other contexts we might be grading, or whose own work might 
make us wonder over mistakes of logic or doctrine. That is but a first taste 
of the problem, an amuse bouche of absurdity prepared by the enigmatic 
surrealist chef in back.  
What are these students doing apart from making up or down decisions 
on the basis of 52 weeks of law school experience, frequently in doctrinal 
areas or methodologies with which they themselves are not familiar? Well, 
there’s the citation-stuff; an elaborate and apparently almost entirely func-
tionless hieratic set of rituals designed to achieve consistency with an enor-
mous Blue (or Maroon) Sacred Text. In terms of Reform or Orthodox, 
we are definitely on the Orthodox side of the ledger.  
Then there is the obsessive search for “Authority” for every point. In my 
very first article, I mentioned that the fight with relativism ran, like a fault 
line, through the humanities and sometimes even the sciences. Authority 
was, appropriately, demanded. My weak joke that the demand itself seemed 
to offer proof of the point was, rightly, ignored. I provided some citation 
to Hume and Wittgenstein, I think. That was also rejected. I was told that 
Dumping: On Law Reviews 
WINTER 2021 181 
I needed to start at Anthropology and go through to Zoology, sustaining the 
proposition for each. My response, if memory serves, was “See Widener 
Library generally.” 
One is left with a scholarly discipline, picking as its gatekeepers those 
perhaps least suited for the job, while those gatekeepers immerse them-
selves in labyrinthine and pointless devotion to a task that could literally be 
performed by a computer, all wrapped in a fetishistic worship of citations 
for (and parentheticals about) the blindingly obvious. Unsurprisingly, the 
result is that no one – other than the people I addressed in the second para-
graph – think the process of being edited, on average, reliably improves 
the articles. Here I am talking about net improvement – measured against 
the opportunity-costs of the silly demands, meaningless formalisms and 
errors of fact, grammar and style helpfully introduced in multiple rounds 
of editing by people who do not communicate with each other into an errat-
ically redlined article that was actually pretty good when it first hit SSRN. 
To put it another way, how many more articles could you have written 
over the course of a career if journals merely made up/down decisions? 
Net/net, this makes no sense, does it?  
The world-weary cynic will weigh in at this point and say, “well it’s really 
just a credentialing function, you know. You are making too much of it.” I 
am all for world-weary cynicism, or at least Stoicism, but if you were 
“credentialing” for a profession, why on earth would this set of rituals and 
skills be the one you chose, rather than say skill at euchre or tiddlywinks, 
or crosswords? Why would the students, or their employers, want them 
to be tortured into learning these skills? Also, whatever your answer, that 
may be what is in it for the students. What is in it for us?  
Some possible answers are provided below, each in the style of a differ-
ent take on legal theory. These are, to repeat, tongue-in-cheek. The ones 
you find mildly amusing, or even thought-provoking, probably say more 
about your scholarly predilections than about law reviews.  
LAW & LITERATURE  
(AND SOME CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES) 
t’s always about authorship, isn’t it? As a discipline, law has a uniquely 
tortured relationship to authorship and particularly to the romantic au-
thor, dazzling in her originality. While other disciplines encourage their 
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members to assert originality in everything they produce, in our doctrinal 
mode we are author-deniers. Look at our Canon; the judges whose names 
appear again and again in our casebooks. The high-point, the cynosure of 
the art, is the judge who can bring up a dramatically original argument, 
can transform the doctrine utterly, all while claiming that there is nothing 
to look at here, that this is merely the mechanical application of the rule, 
routine and boring.  
Cardozo is a classic case-in-point. Remember how, in McPherson v. Buick, 
he overturns decades of precedent on privity, while making an exception 
about foreseeably dangerous articles consume a well-understood rule? It is 
a tour de force and it actually contains a morally compelling and legally novel 
argument. But Cardozo must deny it. We have always been at war with 
Eastasia. Privity has always been nullified for everything more dangerous 
than toilet paper, and possibly even there. We invite our students to marvel 
over the “craftsmanship” of the opinion. We put him in the Canon.  
How does this shape law reviews, though? Take that fascinating genre 
“the Student Note,” one that I have actually found to contain many fine 
and informative pieces of work. The Student Note is constituted by two 
fundamental rules: the Preemption Rule and the Subcite Rule. The 
Preemption Rule says that “thou shalt not sayeth anything that has been 
said before.” The Subcite Rule says that “thou shalt not sayeth anything 
that hasn’t, for that would Lack Authority.” It is in the asymptotically van-
ishing “deadly space between” those two rules (and here would be the cite 
to Melville) that the Student Note must live and move and find its being. 
The fact that our students nevertheless produce some pretty good work is 
a testament to their talents.  
When student author becomes student editor, the Preemption Rule 
governs the article’s acceptance process, while the Subcite Rule governs the 
Bildungsroman of the article’s editing, both its oral stage (endless hunger for 
citations) and its anal stage (endless fussiness about how they are formatted.) 
Our obsessive denial of authority helps produce the irrational semantic spaces 
in which our own authorship is produced! Add Baudrillard to taste, and 
serve. To quote a memorable line from a student in my Law and Literature 
class, “It’s like a metaphor.”  
[Warning: do not think too long about this comment. A chuckle or a sigh 
is fine. But if you start really to think about it? To repeat it over and over? 
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Herman Melville, patron saint of the Student Note. 
L.F. Grant, in Raymond M. Weaver,  
Herman Melville: Mariner and Mystic (1921). 
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To wonder if that makes it a simile? To say it to yourself like a mantra until 
the words lose all meaning, and you, all sense of self? That could be Very 
Bad. They will find you in the morning, like the bride in Sartre’s The Words, 
crouched naked and mad on top of the wardrobe, repeating “It’s, like, a 
metaphor?” in the bright, quizzical uptones of a Southern California Valley 
accent.]  
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If a critical legal studies version of the law and literature account is de-
sired, these two rules would form the “fundamental contradiction,” the 
mediation of which produces the institution above it in a fractal pattern of 
compulsively repeated, but futile, denial on ever-finer levels of particularity. 
(Probably Claude Levi-Strauss and Duncan Kennedy.) 
INTERNATIONAL POWER POLITICS 
he realist – and here I am thinking more of international realists, Myres 
McDougal rather than Felix Cohen – sees that we are living in a vicious 
struggle for national preeminence, in which we must be endlessly vigilant 
for possible attacks coming from our enemies. If you stay awake worrying 
about cyberattacks on our electric grid, this may be you. Seen in the harsh 
spotlight of this realism, the true insidiousness of the law review scheme 
becomes clear.  
Churchill, perhaps apocryphally, is said to have claimed that The Times 
crossword was more destructive to British productivity than a German 
bombing raid. Every day it took hundreds of thousands of hours from the 
brightest minds of Britain and wasted it in meaningless, unproductive  
activity. “But how does this relate to law reviews?” Do I have to draw you 
a map, sheeple!? Perhaps, I do.  
Think of all that our students accomplish while going to law school 
full-time. They work in Innocence Projects, freeing the wrongly incarcer-
ated. They defend asylum-seekers, act as guardians, help local businesses 
incorporate, give volunteer tax assistance and represent victims of domestic 
violence. They educate themselves beyond law school classes, or create 
guided readings seminars in the intellectual topics of the day. Now imagine 
what they might accomplish if we freed them from the job of learning how 
to Bluebook, or collectively writing thousands of entries for casenote com-
petitions, entries generated in haste, read as cursorily as college essays, 
and then discarded. Imagine them free from the job of demanding citations 
for the correlation of poverty with the absence of wealth, or the fortunate 
happenstance of beaches being so close to the sea, if sea-bathing is desired. 
Imagine the joy of the fourth layer of the editing process, whose job it is to 
undo the changes introduced by the third layer, while scattering unflagged 
and sometimes ungrammatical edits throughout the text, when they can 
finally shed that burden! 
T 
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This, like Churchill’s crossword, is obviously the result of a long-
running attack by a hostile power, an attack that every year takes hundreds 
of thousands of hours of labor from some of the brightest students we have 
and burns it, a Bonfire of the Analities, if you will. What could we have 
accomplished as a society, from small acts of kindness and mercy to grand 
projects of the young and idealistic, if it were not for this pernicious drain 
on our energies? 
Obviously, some parts of the theory still need development. The dura-
tion of the attack makes the identity of the perpetrator particularly myste-
rious. My working hypothesis is that it is British revenge for that whole 
independence unpleasantness, one last rude gesture in the grand tradition 
of John Cleese and the Ministry of Silly Walks. Notice which profession 
they are targeting. The very group that wrote the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Constitution; the architects of a rebellious Republic. 
Coincidence!? I admit, however, that the Illuminati may also be involved. 
Further study is needed. 
TWO FLAVORS OF FUNCTIONALISM 
he world-weary cynic has a smarter, more thoughtful cousin: function-
alism. There are two functionalisms, actually, the Chicago School, 
efficiently adaptive, public choice variety and the hegemonic, Gramsci, 
Horkheimer and Adorno, variety. 
Let us start with a public choice perspective. Contrary to all that has 
been written in this essay so far, and certainly to the Churchillian conspiracy 
theory above, law reviews are in fact brilliantly designed for a particular 
purpose; it just isn’t the purpose you thought it was. Law review customs 
are like the rules of the common law, endlessly threshed in a Priestian-mill 
of repeat encounters until only the efficient survive, or even the Hayekian 
private ordering of Shasta ranchers, layering private informal norms on a 
backbone of hard law in a quest for better organization. “Is that purpose the 
production of a rational mechanism for the assessment, editing and publi-
cation of legal scholarship?” you ask. Clearly not. Don’t make me laugh.  
The public choice theorist delights in showing you how the apparent 
ludicrous inefficiencies of some bureaucracy are in fact highly functional in 
terms of the incumbents and beneficiaries of that organization. The Chicago 
school always loved what Bob Gordon called the “épater les sissies” style of 
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argument: “Sell the babies!” “Optimal dishonesty!” (This was trolling the 
libs, before it was cool.) If you put both together, you get the explanation 
of law reviews.  
Law reviews, and in particular the utterly meaningless, pointless for-
malisms of law review work, are brilliantly designed for a single purpose: 
separating the merely very smart from the very smart who can, for hun-
dreds of hours, perform tedious, repetitive tasks of questionable social 
worth. It is the latter that Big Law requires and law reviews are literally 
built around the functional requirements of that goal. Far from being irra-
tional, this is a superb sorting mechanism for the needs of industrial-scale 
legal practice. (In reality, I associate this actual insight not with public 
choice theorists but with Dave Trubek. Score one for the law and society 
movement.) 
The hegemonic variant takes the basic functionalist tune and, to para-
phrase Bob Gordon again, replaces its triumphant trumpet salutations to 
efficiency with the dark minor chords of domination. Law reviews are 
indeed well-suited to the warped vision of quality and standards functional 
for the hegemonic ideology of alienated legal labor in Late Capitalism. 
(For those not familiar with the lingo, that is the Frankfurt school way of 
saying that Big Law sucks, that it needs to suck, that it needs both parties to 
pretend it doesn’t suck and then to repress the fact you are both pretending.) 
The student learns in a law review to boast of the extremity of her pointless 
labors, fitting her well for later boasts about how many billable hours she 
has clocked this month and how seldom she has even seen her apartment. 
Arduousness provides its own meaning – just as painful rituals prepare an 
initiant to enter a cult, while simultaneously making the game seem worth 
the candle. In this vision, migraine-inducing subcite sessions are the ritual 
scars of our tribe. “If it hurts so much, it must be good, right?”  
THE STUDENT REVOLUTIONARY 
et us close, though, on a happier note. Scholars from other disciplines 
mock us for having the lowest and most irrational publication stand-
ards in academia. What they don’t understand is the brilliant, even sub-
versive nature of the enterprise. Peer review provides a powerful form of 
entrenchment to dominant paradigms of academic thought. An iconoclastic  
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A ranch in Shasta County, California, fertile ground for legal theorizing. 
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idea that challenges the orthodoxy, rather than saying original things within 
it, is likely to meet with rejection after rejection. Thomas Kuhn believed 
the real method for paradigm-revolution is to have all the old guys die. 
Nothing else worked that well.  
Law reviews upend this tendency! The second and third year students 
may not even know what the dominant paradigm is. “This Einstein guy 
seems to be doing physics kind of stuff. Let’s publish!” The Crazy 8 Ball of 
the law review submission process is not a bug but a feature. Law reviews 
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embed a radical, and again I will say, Saturnalian process – a hierarchy 
inversion – at the heart of a conservative discipline. “Law and literature! 
Critical race theory! Feminist Legal theory! Sure, why not?” They arrived 
decades before they might have in a more hierarchical journal structure. 
All of the meaningless formalistic editing jobs? Well, we have to cloak our 
student-led insurrection in the robes of formality. What’s more, now we 
get to torture the professors. We will even call the primary instrument of 
their torture a “Bluebook.” Poetic justice! Aux armes, étudiants! You have 
nothing to lose but your chain-citations. 
 
 
 
 
